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A PAGE OF HISTORY*
Lehan K. Tunkst
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970. By James W. Hurst.** Charlottes-
ville, Va.: The University of Virginia Press, 1970. Pp. 191. $6.50.
There is much to be learned from the crowded and only occasionally
repetitive paragraphs of this little book which is derived from three
lectures delivered at the University of Virginia in 1969. The fact
upon which its theses are built is that law makers created the corporate
concept and have devoted much attention to it in the past 190 years.
What the law makers have brought forth over so long a period must
be worth evaluating as to means and ends.
The ends of corporate organization are measured against Professor
Hurst's preference for law which is both useful and furnishes maximum
reinforcement for that human conduct which responsibly considers the
welfare of other human beings within as well as without the corporate
entity. Thus, utility and responsibility together are the criteria against
which the "legitimacy" of corporate law is to be judged.
Professor Hurst's particular concern is with state enabling acts.
Action taken by the law makers, as he reads it, leads to the conclu-
sion that the general business incorporation enabling acts and their
administration by public officials are of the greatest utility for large
business organizations functioning through a hierarchy capped by
strong leadership. Indeed, for these corporations, highly satisfactory
treaties with the states in which they choose to incorporate can be
written largely to the businessmen's order as Articles of Incorporation.
Enabling act law and administration is less useful for those wishing to
* "Upon this point [whether a federal estate tax were a 'direct tax' and thus re-
quired to be apportioned among the states according to population in each under article
one, section nine of the Constitution] a page of history is worth a volume of logic."
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (emphasis
added).
t Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., 1935, University of Nebraska;
J.D., 1938, Northwestern University; J.S.D., 1947 Yale University.
** ,Vilas Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. No doubt Professor Hurst
has intensively worked longer than any other American legal historian, helping edu-
cate more American legal historians, than any other present member of a University
law faculty in the United States. His especially influential works include THE GROWTH
OF AMERICA LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950).
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function as an incorporated partnership (close corporation). In both
instances, however, this law is inadequate to enforce the author's con-
cept of responsibility. With respect to enabling acts, corporate law
only escapes illegitimacy if supplementary legislation, such as the fed-
eral securities laws, is considered a part of its frame of reference.
What were the forces by which law makers came to omit regulatory
measures of early charters and enabling acts? Professor Hurst explains
that the failure is due to the combination of vigorous businessmen and
the absence of law makers seeking the union of good business, eco-
nomic growth and social well-being.
If this has been a fair statement of the writer's position, it is appar-
ent that conscientiously to reach such a conclusion requires the sifting
and weighing of a large number of legal considerations. Although
there may be some phenomena, such as required cumulative voting,
which he has weighed and does not mention, Professor Hurst does
manage to question and analyze a large percentage of the elements
comprising the legal structure of the corporation. The author writes
carefully about every element he mentions, relating each to the legiti-
macy criteria he advocates. This review will deal very selectively with
his detailed presentation. It will also present an aside on historical
method, offer one suggestion for further research, and speculate on
what should now be the desired goal in the light of the conclusions his
work supports. Hopefully, this review demonstrates throughout that
looking backward accurately is a more useful part of developing the
law than merely remembering the past in order to avoid being "con-
demned to repeat it."'
The reader will find implicit in the book a caution against comfort-
ably narrowing the frame of reference of "corporation law." An ap-
propriate elasticity requires, if the problems of responsibility are to be
dealt with as well as the law permits, consideration of the positive law
concerning such matters as public utilities, antitrust, and collective
bargaining. Though each of these is technically applicable without
regard to the form of business association, they are greatly occupied
with corporate affairs. The point is important for those who wish the
satisfaction of delivering complete client service on present corporate
issues.
Professor Hurst divides his discussion of the development of "cor-
I. G. SN I,\\AYAN\. RLASON IN COMMON SENsr 284 (1905).
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poration law" into three periods of time. In the early stages, it was a
not very distinct part of a m~lange of law dealing with municpal
government, charitable and religious foundations, and companies
formed for political tasks as well as for profit. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the "private corporation aggregate" had emerged,
containing the seeds of what became the familiar problems of internal
division of powers and earnings, and of the modes of finance which the
general business corporation enabling acts subsequently left so largely
to the realm of private law making. This development assisted in the
establishment of large and powerful corporations to execute the eco-
nomic development of the private sector. It became increasingly more
difficult to protect the interests of those affected by the corporation
solely by employing the rights and remedies permitted by the state
enabling acts. Perhaps it was the outbreak of the various industrial
codes under the National Recovery Act of the economically depressed
1930's which visibly marked the beginning of large-scale resort to fed-
eral and, later, state regulatory law affixing responsibility in corporate
matters. At each subsequent point, new sources of law relevant to the
corporate condition began to flourish. Yet, despite this peripheral
development, the enabling acts remained relatively free from the regu-
latory provisions necessary to meet Professor Hurst's responsibility
requirement.
One Hurst thesis which warrants comment is that state enabling acts,
whether or not so intended by state legislators, effectuate a policy of
concentrating the control of wealth in corporate form among corpor-
ate insiders. This argument is supported by reference to successive
legislative elimination of early enabling act limitations on the amount
of capital and the types of assets corporations could hold, on corporate
purposes and powers, and the removal of the requirements of preemp-
tive rights and public reporting.
Eventually, only skeletal requirements for obtaining certificates of
incorporation were left. By the careful exercise of the power granted
by modem enabling acts to draw by-laws to the order of the board of
directors, the corporate framework comes closer than any other form
of business association to giving those in control a vehicle to drive as
rapidly as they can. The author finds few additions to this legislation
which have fostered responsibility to either an oppressed intra-corpor-
ate group or the public. Only the explicit power to make philanthropic
gifts and the statutory appraisal rights of dissenters to such funda-
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mental changes as the sale of substantially all corporate assets, mer-
gers, or consolidations are noted as approaching the responsibility
criterion.
Courts have similarly favored the archetypical business effort set
forth above, both by statutory interpretation and by entirely judge-made
law. Examples furnished by Professor Hurst include: entering only the
face value of low par stock rather than the amount received therefor
by the corporation as capital items requiring any protection; reducing
capital protection by allowing dividends to be paid from current earn-
ings as long as insolvency is not induced even though capital is im-
paired; and yielding to critics of the "trust fund cushion for creditors"
theory of corporate capital protection on the grounds that such a doc-
trine is inconsistent with trust law itself. Procedurally, courts and
legislators reacted to suits of objecting shareholders seeking to bring
controlling interests to account by requiring plaintiffs to have been
shareholders at the time of the alleged wrong or to have inherited
shares meeting those conditions and by requiring the posting of a bond
at the commencement of the suit for the expenses of successful defend-
ants. In the same spirit, corporations have been permitted to pay
defense expenses of officers and directors even though the eventual
judgment may be rendered against them.
To assist in selecting law makers and legal means for effectuating
future public policies for corporations, historians might investigate
further to ascertain whether state legislators and administrators have,
in the enabling act area, consciously intended to implement substantive
policy which encourages the concentration of wealth in a few corpor-
ate insiders. Contemporary periodicals with such features as Fortune
magazine's "500 Corporations" seem to confirm such a result. Profes-
sor Hurst admits that he relied heavily on secondary authority in
writing this book; the paucity of state legislative records and reliable
contemporary accounts confines the historian very largely to inferences
from the evidence preserved in statutory enactments and appellate
court opinions. There is one related study to which he does not refer.
Professor Edward R. Hayes was able to note differences between cer-
tificates of incorporation requested and those allowed during a limited
period of time in one jurisdiction.2 His account suggests that adminis-
2. Hayes, A ,thorization and AI.tance of Capital Stock by the Iowa Corporation
(pt. 2), 39 IOWA I. REv. 608. 613-14, 633-34(1953).
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trative approval of self-written certificates was neither automatic nor an
ideal "administrative brake." It might pay investigators to study such
administration in the more commercial states.
From the book reviewed here, one cannot fail to be impressed by
the effect of the set of assumptions, which might be called "attitudes
of lawmakers," concerning means. It takes an historian to trace their
slow development and leave the reader with the inference that they
are not likely to change rapidly. From "corporate enabling act law,"
to which the larger share of the text of this book is devoted, perhaps
the lesson is that legislation well crafted over generations to meet a par-
ticular need builds a massive intolerance to serving other needs. The
reader becomes persuaded that, even should federal incorporation for
interstate business be required, "corporate enabling act law" is not a likely
means for achieving any future public purpose except, perhaps, to
enable business to organize and operate its sub-cultures for profit. As
needs for legal means to effectuate public policies may emerge, it does
not seem realistic to expect the enabling acts to be the mechanism by
which corporate analogues, for example, of government ombudsmen
and "freedom of information" acts, might be made parts of the larger
corporate subculture.3 A functional subject-matter selection of other
means is more likely.
3. An example of such a rejection follows. To meet labor's need, New Jersey in
1920 amended its corporation enabling act to permit directors to be elected from non-
stockholding labor, although other directors were then required to be shareholders
elected by shareholders. Entrepreneurs of corporations seldom saw fit to use this pro-
vision in initially obtained certificates. Later on in corporate life, labor almost never
sought to bargain for it. Other ways of sharing the power in which labor was inter-
ested were superior to incurring any schizophrenic management responsibility, while
still having responsibility for observing existing, and negotiating new, collective bar-
gaining contracts. Having lapsed into desuetude, the provision for employee-directors
elected by employees was omitted in the 1968 revision. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
14-9-1(d), 14-7-2 (1939), with NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A-8-1 (1969). Cf. Brooks, The
Marts of Trade (the Anti-Corporation), THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 9, 1971, at 138.
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